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Abstract
Contacts of the two logicians are listed, and all G"odel’s written mentions of Tarski’s work
are quoted. Why did G"odel almost never mention Tarski’s de0nition of truth in his notes and
papers? This puzzle of G"odel’s silence, proposed by Feferman, is not merely biographical or
psychological but has interesting connections to G"odel’s philosophical views.
No satisfactory answer is given by the three “standard” explanations: (i) no need to repeat the
work already done; (ii) Tarski’s achievement was obvious to G"odel; (iii) G"odel’s exceptional
caution. In fact, (i), Tarski had done the work, but G"odel almost never mentioned the achieve-
ment; (ii), the obviousness is no explanation for the omission of Tarski’s work in contexts in
which an application of the de0nition of satisfaction was useful, and even necessary; (iii), the
point was not just caution: if G"odel had felt the need to mention the program of scienti0c
semantics he could easily have done that in his manuscripts, or in conversations.
Three ideas, detectable in G"odel’s approach, can help us understand G"odel’s silence: (A) the
idea of truth as the intuitive provability in the most general sense; de0ning it set-theoretically
would contribute nothing. (B) the idea of truth as an inexhaustible idea in the sense of Kant;
“truth in general” is a category that must be applicable to all kinds of sentential expressions;
also, while for G"odel language was secondary, Tarski’s de0nition is focused on language. (C)
the idea of logic as the universal language, in Hintikka’s sense, as opposed to the perception of
logic as a reinterpretable calculus; hence the thesis that semantics is inexpressible. G"odel always
remains a Platonist who asks a natural question: what does really happen in the realm of abstract
objects?
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Tarski was 5 years senior than G"odel and began his research activities a few years
earlier. Yet, since the end of 1920s, throughout most of their lives, their careers were
running parallel to each other. Tarski was often referring to G"odel, and acknowledged
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how big was G"odel’s inHuence on his work. In contrast to that, G"odel’s references
to Tarski are nearly non-existent. Hence the main problem concerning their relations:
why did G"odel almost never mention Tarski and his accomplishments, speci0cally his
de0nition of truth, in his papers and notes? The question is not merely biographi-
cal, nor does it pertain only to G"odel’s personal psychology. His silence on Tarski’s
accomplishments has an interesting connection to his philosophy, and his philosophy
is linked to the most penetrating achievements of mathematical logic. The puzzle of
G"odel’s silence has been stated and discussed by Solomon Feferman, who is a major
expert on both the life of G"odel and, more recently, that of Tarski. 1 The aim of the
present paper is to gather the relevant elements of the problem and to present some
ideas that could lead towards its solution.
1. Meetings and direct contacts
The great logicians met for the 0rst time in Vienna in February 1930, and then also
in that city in 1935. 2 Tarski was in Vienna again in Spring 1936, 3 but they may have
not seen each other, as G"odel could still have been in a sanatorium. 4 Then they met in
America: in 1941–1942 Tarski was in Princeton and was in touch with G"odel. 5 They
were also together at the Princeton Bicentennial conference on 17 December 1946, 6
and met in March 1962, 7 and maybe on other occasions. They were also writing letters
to each other from January 1931 to about 1970, according to Tarski’s son. 8
Tarski’s visit in 1930 was due to Hans Hahn’s invitation. At his seminar, Tarski
spoke on set theory, and also on the metatheory of the propositional calculus. He met
in a cafe with Carnap and G"odel. The latter told Tarski about his dissertation, that is
the completeness theorem, which of course met with interest. Carnap later wrote 9 how
instructive had been their conversations, especially Tarski’s view that concepts relating
to deductive systems must be expressed in a metalanguage. It was unclear in those
times whether one can formulate correctly sentences about sentences. It is of interest
that the positive answer had been clear to Tarski well before G"odel began scienti0c
research. In a 1936 letter to Neurath 10 he stated that “the Warsaw Circle” had that
opinion some 10 years before this was accepted in Vienna, and that this had an essential
inHuence upon Carnap, and helped overcome an “inhibiting” inHuence of Wittgenstein.
1 The main references are Feferman [5] and Feferman [6].
2 See the photograph in the Collected Works of G"odel [13, before p. 16].
3 Carnap, Intellectual autobiography, in: Schilpp (Ed.) [29, p. 61].
4 In Spring and Summer he was in sanatoria; see [13, p. 40].
5 Cf. Feferman [6, p. 58]. In Tarski’s Nachlass in Bancroft Library, Berkeley, there is a notebook of
excursions (1923–1945); the item under 9 July 1942 reads “New York–Boston (pociNagiem K&A G"odels)”,
that is they went together by train.
6 See for example the photo in [14, p. 142].
7 See their photograph taken by Maria KokoszyPnska, in [14, p. 252].
8 Tarski [37, p. 261]. Sixteen Tarski’s letters to G"odel published there show that their relation was quite
close.
9 Intellectual autobiography, in: Schilpp (Ed.) [29, p. 30].
10 See Tarski [36, p. 207].
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According to Tarski, 11 Carnap himself stressed the importance of Tarski’s lectures in
Vienna.
G"odel seems to have had no particular interest in Tarski’s conception, and he never
said, unlike Carnap, that he was inHuenced by Tarski. If there was an inHuence it
would have been through Carnap. 12 There is no evidence of any essential inHuence
upon G"odel. He did not need, it seems, Tarski’s inspiration to diQerentiate between
language and metalanguage. During their 0rst meeting in Vienna G"odel was already
working on the problem of completeness, or rather incompleteness, of the theories like
the one developed in Principia Mathematica. Thus he was most probably on the verge
of the discovery of the phenomenon opposite to the distinguishing of metalanguages, a
phenomenon much less natural, namely his famous method of expressing the concepts
and relations from the level of metatheory in the elementary arithmetic. So while Tarski
was convincing Carnap that it was necessary to make the distinction between language
and metalanguage, for G"odel it probably was obvious; his research led in the other
direction: metatheory can be expressed to some extent inside the theory due to the
method of arithmetization.
The two great logicians were in direct contact at least once more. Toward the end
of his career, G"odel tried to prove a theorem on the cardinality of continuum. In 1970
he sent to Tarski a letter with a note containing a proof that continuum is ℵ2, based
on some plausible (to him) assumptions about sets. He wanted to publish the proof in
the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. It is de0nitely noteworthy that
he chose Tarski to accept the paper. Tarski, a leading authority also in the 0eld of set
theory, was apparently highly respected by G"odel. Tarski gave the paper to Solovay
who could not understand it, and soon G"odel admitted that he had committed an error.
Incidentally, later he tried to prove CH on the basis of the same assumptions on sets. 13
2. Godel’s mentions of Tarski
As is well known, Tarski always admitted that having learnt G"odel’s methods he
could produce the proof of the unde0nability of truth, which was an important addition
to his semantic theory. This was said in Tarski [32] as well in his later expositions of
his theory of truth. 14 At the same time, Tarski was stressing his own research which,
independent of G"odel, had led him in the same direction. Also, in Postscriptum, written
in 1935, to the German version of his paper, he wrote that he had independently consid-
ered “the interpretation of the metasystem in arithmetic”, that is “the so called ‘method
11 In a conversation in Prague in 1935; cf. the letter to Neurath, in Tarski [36, p. 207].
12 Carnap recalled that the problems he debated with Tarski he often discussed with G"odel (Schilpp [29,
p. 30]; cf. Dawson [4, p. 62]).
13 G"odel’s notes, as well as an unsent letter to Tarski, are now available in [15] together with Solovay’s
analysis: [15, pp. 405–425]. After a detailed introduction by Solovay the two notes and the letter follow
under 1970a–c.
14 See Tarski [35, p. 247]. See also, e.g., Tarski [33] (Tarski [36, p. 216], Tarski [34,36, p. 254]). Jerzy
 LoPs used to suggest that the inHuence of G"odel was even stronger than Tarski admitted.
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of the arithmetizing the metalanguage’ which was developed far more completely and
quite independently by G"odel”. 15
On the other hand, G"odel never mentioned Tarski in his main publications. A foot-
note to his lectures of 1934, added 30 years later to the version printed in Davis [1],
is the only exception. In the original mimeographed text, G"odel wrote that the liar
paradox can be considered as a proof that
“false statement in [a language] B” cannot be expressed in B.
The footnote 25 16 reads:
For a closer examination of this fact see Tarski’s papers [32,34]. In these two
papers the concept of truth relating to sentences of a language is discussed sys-
tematically. See also Carnap 1934.
This is an acknowledgment of Tarski’s work, but clearly it is expressed in a weak
way. This and the other mentions of Tarski’s work suggest that it was of no help to
G"odel.
G"odel mentioned Tarski’s achievement once more, this time in connection with Car-
nap. In a 1935 review of a 1934 article by Carnap on antinomies and incompleteness
he wrote:
With respect to the antinomies of the second kind and the notion of truth, the
same view was advocated by A. Tarski in his 1932 and further in his 1933a and
1935. 17
One more mention of Tarski appeared in a work by G"odel during his lifetime. The
anthology Davis [1] contains G"odel’s comments made in 1946, after a lecture by Tarski
at the Princeton Bicentennial conference. G"odel began by saying:
Tarski has stressed in his lecture (and I think justly) the great importance of the
concept of general recursiveness (or Turing’s computability). 18
This does not refer to any of Tarski’s results.
During G"odel’s lifetime two more remarks by him on Tarski were published. In the
1966 collection of lectures by von Neumann, he is quoted as saying that the theorem
on the unde0nability of truth
is the true reason for the existence of undecidable propositions in the formal
systems containing arithmetic. I did not, however, formulate it explicitly in my
paper of 1931 but only in my Princeton lectures of 1934. The same theorem was
proved by Tarski in his paper on the concept of truth published in 1933. 19
15 Tarski [35, p. 278].
16 The quotation and the footnote is after [13, p. 363].
17 [13, p. 389]. The review is designated as 1935b.
18 [14, p. 150].
19 He wrote that to A.W. Burks, the editor of von Neumann lectures, [27, p. 56].
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In Wang [38], where fragments of some letters of G"odel to the author have been
published (with G"odel’s approval), the letter of 1967 is quoted: in his famous 1931
paper G"odel had to use
the concept of ‘objective mathematical truth’ as opposed to that of ‘demonstra-
bility’ (: : :), with which it was generally confused before my own and Tarski’s
work. 20
Clearly, in these words we see a con0rmation of the impression that G"odel indepen-
dently found Tarski’s results.
Two more remarks were published in G"odel’s Collected Works, after his death. Both
refer to the problem of the de0nition of truth. In 1938, in a lecture at Zilsel’s he said
that
There can be mathematically very interesting proofs that do not accomplish that
[the proof of consistency in order to lay the foundations of mathematics more
securely] (as for example, Tarski’s for analysis). 21
The reference is to the de0nability of truth for languages of 0nite order and its use to
consistency proofs. It is noteworthy that here—and, it seems, only here—G"odel gives
a positive assessment (“very interesting”).
In 1940, in a lecture on the consistency of CH given at Brown University, referring
to partial universes of constructible sets, G"odel wrote:
Now this metamathematical notion of truth, i.e. the class of numbers of true propo-
sitions, can be de0ned by a method similar to the one which Tarski applied for
the system of Principia Mathematica. The point is to well-order all propositions
of our domain in such a manner that the truth of each depends in a precisely
describable manner on the truth of some of the preceding; this gives then the
desired recursive de0nition. 22
Thus G"odel referred to Tarski once in a footnote, made in 1965, to lecture notes (of
1934), once in a review (in 1935), once in a discussion (in 1946, published in 1965),
twice in letters (1966 and 1967) published later (1974), and twice in posthumously
published lecture notes (of 1938 and 1940). Therefore the question is not ‘what did
G"odel write on Tarski?’ but ‘why did he ignore the theory and achievements of the
man commonly perceived to be a leading logician of the century?’ And what did he
think about them?
In extensive reports of talks with G"odel and in comments contained in Wang [41]
Tarski’s name appears only once, among those few individuals with whom G"odel
was “friendly” in the Vienna period. Joint excursions (see footnote 5) and the let-
ters mentioned above indicate that a relationship between them continued in America.
20 Wang [38, p. 9].
21 [15, pp. 88–89].
22 [15, p. 181].
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Nevertheless, we have almost no documents that would tell us what G"odel thought on
Tarski, and whether he held any particular opinion on him.
Let us come back to the problem of the de0nability and unde0nability of truth,
so that we can better see the attitude of G"odel to Tarski’s method and his research
program.
3. Banning truth?
From our present standpoint, the problem of truth was a major challenge for G"odel,
and for mathematical logic in general. More speci0cally, the problem was how to de0ne
the concept of a true mathematical statement, or, even more speci0cally, that of a true
statement about natural numbers and sets of them, that is about the objects to which
referred his system P, as well as all fundamental systems then considered.
As is now well known, in Summer 1930, 23 G"odel realized that provability is not
equivalent to truth, but he felt that his argument was not suWcient, and rather then
show it to other logicians he continued work in order to construct an example of a
true but unprovable sentence. His way to what is known as Tarski’s theorem was as
follows.
Initially G"odel planned to contribute to the progress of Hilbert’s Program. He wanted
to show that in elementary arithmetic one can de0ne a model of analysis, or the
second-order arithmetic (with quanti0ers that range over sets of natural numbers). This
would require an arithmetical de0nition of the relation of membership so that the
axiom of comprehension, that is (∃n) (∀x)(x∈ n≡’(x)), would follow. Now, as G"odel
himself wrote in 1970s, in an unsent letter, 24 if instead of truth of ’ (in the above
equivalence) we could refer to its provability (in a given system), then de0nition of
“∈” would be simple. “Hence, if truth were equivalent to provability, we would have
reached our goal”. 25 This is impossible because, says G"odel, “it follows from the
correct solution of the semantic paradoxes that ‘truth’ of the propositions of a language
cannot be expressed in the same language, while provability (being an arithmetical
relation) can”. It cannot be expressed because otherwise the liar paradox would be
reproducible. This observation can be treated as a version of Tarski’s theorem. We
know that G"odel obtained the theorem before Tarski, 26 because the observation that
provability in the given system cannot be identical with truth is used by him in a 1931
letter to Zermelo, 27 and then publicly in his lectures in 1934. 28
23 See his words in Wang [41, p. 83].
24 In G"odel’s Nachlass there is the text of an unsent letter to Yossefa Balas, who had asked several
questions on 27 May 1970. See Wang [40, p. 85], and Dawson [4, p. 280]. Feferman [5] seems to be the
0rst who used the letter.
25 In the letter to Balas, Dawson [4, p. 61].
26 This was stated in Wang [39,40, p. 90], and in Feferman [5], and later by others, for example WolePnski
[42] and Murawski [25], where relevant quotations are gathered. WolePnski, however, puts a question mark
at the thesis that G"odel really had Tarski’s theorem (see below).
27 G"odel’s letter of 12 October 1931 was published by Grattan-Guinness [16].
28 See G"odel’s 1934 lectures, part 7, in [13, p. 363].
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In the 1934 lectures, it is stated, similarly as he did in the letter to Zermelo, that once
we know that provability is de0nable and truth is not, then assuming that a provable
sentence is true, or Pr⊆Tr, we get Pr⊂Tr, so there must be undecidable sentences,
only we have no concrete example.
I am still puzzled why in 1930 he did not treat that as a suWcient, though indirect,
proof of incompleteness, and did not publish it, but instead began to work on the
construction of an unprovable and obviously true sentence. Or rather, he saw the proof
as an argument good for him but not for others. He thought that his argument could
have been invented by others, if they had been able to use the concept of truth as
fundamentally diQerent from provability. He told Wang, in 1976, that “it was anti-
Platonic prejudice which prevented people from getting my results. This fact is a clear
proof that the prejudice is a mistake”. 29
Why didn’t G"odel publish the indirect proof of incompleteness? The 0rst explanation
was given by Feferman [5]. Other authors follow this ground-breaking paper. The ex-
planation is seen in the fact that G"odel was unusually cautious. He feared that relying
on the concept of truth would diminish the acceptance of his results, because it would
cause suspicion on the part of Hilbert, and of all the others who were following him.
In metamathematics they were allowing 0nitistic methods only. G"odel was cautious
indeed: in the beginning of his epoch-making 1931 paper, having given a sketch of
the incompleteness proof he writes that in the sequel the proof will be given “with
full precision” so that the assumption that “every provable formula is true in the in-
terpretation considered” will be replaced with by a “purely formal and much weaker”
assumption. 30 This assumption is known as !-consistency. G"odel’s manuscripts, re-
vealed after his death, show his cautious attitude. In the already quoted unsent letter
(to Balas) G"odel wrote directly why he had not been dealing with the concept of truth:
“However in consequence of the philosophical prejudices of our time: : : : 2. A
concept of mathematical truth as opposed to demonstrability was viewed with
greatest suspicion and widely rejected as meaningless.” 31
This fragment was crossed out, and the letter remained unsent anyway, but it is clear
that it is a faithful expression of G"odel’s thinking.
Truth was suspicious, provability wasn’t. The dominant philosophers of mathematics
of that time seemed to think ‘What else could mathematical truth mean, if not prov-
ability?’ But the distinguishing of the two is at the root of G"odel’s work. He wrote to
Wang:
: : : it should be noted that the heuristic principle of my construction of undecid-
able number-theoretical propositions in the formal systems of mathematics is the
highly trans0nite concept of ‘objective mathematical truth’ as opposed to that of
‘demonstrability’. 32
29 Wang [41, p. 83].
30 Quoted after [13, p. 151]. G"odel wrote about formulas being “inchaltlich richtig”, contentually correct,
rather than true.
31 Wang [40, p. 85].
32 Wang [38, p. 9].
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In order to oppose them to each other one has to perceive the diQerence. This was
probably obvious to person in the street but was lost from a consistently formalist or
nominalist standpoint. G"odel wrote that
formalists considered formal demonstrability to be an analysis of the concept of
mathematical truth and, therefore, were of course not in a position to distinguish
the two. 33
The point is not that such analysis has to be rejected in advance. A priori, the
project to explain the intuitive, commonplace notion of truth as applied to mathematical
theories via the formal notion of provability makes sense. Theoretically, it might have
been similar to what has happened with the intuitive, commonplace notion of eQective
computability. The fact that its various formal counterparts are equivalent is “a miracle”,
which shows that those formal notions can be seen as a correct analysis of the intuitive
notion. With respect to mathematical truth, this is not the case, contrary to Hilbert’s
expectations; we have learnt this only from G"odel’s work. In particular, his second
incompleteness theorem can be understood as the statement that an obviously true
formula is unprovable: the formula Cons is true if only the consistency of formal
arithmetic is assumed, and this seems doubtless. Of course, the formula is unprovable
inside the considered formal theory, not in some absolute sense of provability.
4. De!nition of truth?
It is generally known that Tarski has de0ned truth for formulas of a formalized
language, using the concept of satisfaction (of a formula by a valuation of variables in
a given domain). 34 G"odel used this concept without de0nition, in an intuitive manner,
as had done his predecessors: L"owenheim, Skolem, Hilbert, Bernays, and others. Did
G"odel believe that this approach was suWcient? It seems he did. His proof of the
completeness of the 0rst-order quanti0er calculus did require the concept of truth in
an (arbitrary) model; the formula true in every interpretation was called by him, and
also by other representatives of the German school, “allgemeing"ultige Formel”. 35 It is
of interest that at 0rst, in Warsaw, Tarski and his students were not sure what G"odel
actually achieved, because he did not de0ne the notion of validity. 36
Only once did G"odel make a remark suggesting that he had a feeling that some
de0nition was needed. In 1932, in a letter to Carnap, he wrote that he would give
“a de0nition of ‘true’ ” in a review paper on mathematical logic, which he prepared
together with Heyting (but never 0nished). 37 He never came back to this plan, so we
33 Wang [38, p. 10].
34 Tarski [32] in Polish, and its translations into German in 1935, and into English in [35].
35 See [13, pp. 60, 64, 102, etc.]. The German term corresponds to the English term “valid”.
36 This fact is stressed by WolePnski, see [42] (in [44, p. 137])—who refers to a remark made by Kreisel
[24, p. 122].
37 The letter to Carnap of 11 September 1932 has been presented by K"ohler, see WolePnski [42], (or [44,
p. 135]). G"odel does use the term ‘wahr’.
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may believe that he saw Tarski’s papers as a suWcient treatment of the problem. As
mentioned above, in a lecture of 1940 he did refer to Tarski’s work. 38
What is more, G"odel seemed to understand the problem in depth. In his celebrated
paper [10] he gave a footnote 39 in which it is stated that “the true reason for the
incompleteness in all formal systems of mathematics is that the formation of ever
higher types can be continued into the trans0nite”. And further:
“For it can be shown that the undecidable propositions constructed here become
decidable whenever appropriate higher types are added (for example, the type !
to the system P)”.
Tarski gave a detailed analysis how to use higher types to decide propositions. For
example, Cons is true in the sense of the Tarski style de0nition of satisfaction using
one quanti0er of higher type—either the existential or the universal one. G"odel’s foot-
note just mentioned suggests that G"odel was aware of the situation, and achieved this
independently of Tarski, but he never described it, while Tarski developed the whole
apparatus needed to de0ne satisfaction and truth.
To put it brieHy, the “standard” picture of the relationship between the methods of
Tarski and those of G"odel, based on Feferman’s reHections in [5], is as follows. 40
G"odel discovered by himself everything that he could have taken from Tarski. What
was published by Tarski, G"odel did not have to repeat. What is more, he avoided the
in0nitistic and metaphysical terms, like “truth”, that were seen with suspicion by the
foundational establishment of that time dominated by Hilbert and the Vienna Circle. In
addition, WolePnski has been emphasizing the fact that Tarski respected no limitations in
metamathematical research, because in the Lvov–Warsaw school all conceptual means
were admitted in metatheory. 41 It must be noted here that a similar opinion had been
expressed by E. Post, and by G"odel himself! In the introduction to his dissertation he
wrote that concerning the means of proof “no restriction whatsoever has been made”
as this “does not seem to be more pressing here than for any other mathematical
problem”. 42 G"odel deleted these remarks from the printed version of the paper; he
also deleted other remarks like speculations (made already in 1929!) on the possibility
of the existence of propositions undecidable by precisely stated formal means of infer-
ence, which means that he questioned purely formalist approach to mathematical truth.
B. Dreben and J. van Heijenoort comment that they do not know whether the dele-
tion was due to the inHuence of the thesis supervisor, H. Hahn, or to G"odel’s own
caution. 43
38 In the lecture at Brown University in 1940, see [15, p. 181].
39 Footnote 48a; [13], 180-1. It is mentioned in the context of the de0nition of truth by Feferman in [5]
(Shanker [3, p. 109]), who refers to comments by S. Kripke.
40 This picture is contained in Murawski [25], where the problem of priority with respect to the unde-
0nablilty of truth is discussed. Not surprisingly, largely the same sources are used, and in fact the same
quotations are given in WolePnski [42], and 0rst of all in Feferman’s pioneering study [5].
41 WolePnski [42], 138 and 76, where he quotes a statement to this eQect by Tarski himself, made in 1953.
42 [13, p. 63 and 65].
43 [13, p. 50]. According to WolePnski, Hahn’s pressure was decisive.
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The approaches of both, G"odel and Tarski, are somewhat paradoxical. In Tarski we
can perceive a conHict “between his nominalistic and empiricistic sympathies and his
‘Platonic’ mathematical practice”. 44 Feferman adds that an inverse problem concerns
G"odel: he was a Platonist but “followed the practice of Hilbert’s school”. 45
The thesis on G"odel’s special prudence has been introduced by Feferman [5] in
the article, whose title aptly summarizes the point: “Conviction and caution”. G"odel
had strongly held opinions on many questions. He was especially convinced of the
correctness of Platonism. As is well known, he believed that Platonism was the source
of his discoveries (completeness and incompleteness theorems). By the way, Tarski
had no understanding for that conviction, and thought that G"odel provided an example
of how believing nonsense can lead to good results. 46 At the same time, G"odel did
his best in order not to disclose his conviction. Due to his cautious attitude, in his
famous paper [10] mentions of “truth” are con0ned to the introductory section, and the
proof itself is made without the notion of truth. According to Feferman, the attitude is
the reason why G"odel was not directly involved in the development of notions central
to modern logic, those of truth and computability. Of course, G"odel’s achievements
are crucial for the study of these notions; he himself, however, refrained from their
investigation because of the dominant view that those notions are suspicious.
It is hard to understand G"odel’s attitude. After all, while 0nitism and philosophical
nominalism reigned supreme in the 1920s and 1930s in Hilbert’s school and among
logical positivists, G"odel quickly achieved fame and position that gave him complete
independence. He could have written what he wanted. Despite this he was extremely
cautious: his 0rst direct criticism of the Vienna Circle was published only in 1974,
in the book by Wang. The 0rst expression of mathematical Platonism is contained in
[11], even though G"odel was saying that he had the same view since 1925. 47
Incidentally, it is far from certain that G"odel’s views were so stable and radical, as he
claimed later. In his notes to a lecture in 1933 a remark has been found (concerning the
theory of classes) that “our axioms, if interpreted as meaningful statements, necessarily
presuppose a kind of Platonism, which cannot satisfy any critical mind”. 48 Feferman
comments that it is not clear how to understand this, as several options are available:
either G"odel was not a fully Hedged Platonist yet, or he had doubts concerning ontology,
which is only natural and can happen to each of us, or else he was distinguishing
various kinds of Platonism, for example—as M. Davis had suggested—he could be a
realist with respect to the natural numbers and only gradually came to the conviction
that sets should be treated in the same way. 49 Deciphering further hand-written notes
by G"odel may bring more evidence.
44 WolePnski [43], see [44, p. 126]. According to WolePnski, there is no contradiction because in Warsaw
mathematical school philosophical views were seen as private inclinations, not to be mixed with mathematical
research.
45 Feferman [6, p. 61].
46 Communicated to me by Benson Mates in July 2001.
47 In Grandjean’s questionnaire of 1975, 0lled but never sent back by G"odel; this was revealed by Feferman
[5] (Shanker [31, p. 100]), and then cited by others.
48 [15, p. 50].
49 [15, p. 40].
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The interpretation of this statement is made even more diWcult (as Dawson remarks
in [4]) that it is uncertain whether the comma before “which” is deliberate or unin-
tentional. Without the comma, the statement is weaker: it questions only the kind of
Platonism which cannot satisfy etc.
It is beyond doubt that in 1930s G"odel “shied away from new concepts as an
object of study as opposed to new concepts as a tool for obtaining results (e.g. the
constructible hierarchy)”. 50 Tarski and Turing did the job (the de0nition of satisfaction,
the de0nition of computability) that could have been performed by G"odel. He was
intellectually able to do that but something stopped him. The situation is ironic, as it
would have been suWcient to use his own principle: among the tasks of philosophy
there is conceptual analysis, which is to lead to strict and certain concepts. 51 The
analysis of mechanical computability made by Turing was for G"odel the prime example
of being up to the task. In [12] he wrote that “one has for the 0rst time succeeded in
giving an absolute de0nition of an interesting epistemological notion”. 52 He did not
achieve that—though he did help de0ne recursive functions and the Church thesis—nor
did he undertake a de0nition truth. Was he stopped by his personality traits? This is
precisely Hintikka’s answer. In [22], he emphasizes the fact that G"odel felt insecurity,
and he “needed a safe accepted framework within which to operate”, 53 and he never
let himself to challenge that framework.
Even if some of his personal qualities were essential for his research attitudes, this
gives no explanation why he treated Turing’s accomplishments so diQerently from those
of Tarski. It is highly interesting that G"odel admired Turing’s work and never said
anything similar about Tarski’s construction of satisfaction. He did not try to solve the
problem of the adequate de0nition of the truth of sentences under given interpretation.
Why? The simplest answer is that for him the concept of satisfaction was obvious. He
certainly grasped all the relevant properties of this concept, and it could be seen as
suWcient for his papers of the early 1930s, including the work on the completeness
theorem.
However, some fragments of his papers need a formal de0nition of satisfaction. Of
the three examples given below, two were indicated by Feferman [5,6].
The original de0nition of constructible sets used the de0nition of satisfaction in the
model determined by the given level of the constructible universe, with standard mem-
bership relation. In order to show the absoluteness of his construction (L de0ned inside
L is the same L), it is necessary to express the de0nition of de0nability, that is also that
of satisfaction, inside the original set theory. G"odel avoided this step by introducing
another de0nition of constructibility, but his restraint is diWcult to understand. “Would
he have considered it a point on which he could be challenged?” asks Feferman. 54
Perhaps his results would have been questioned by those who opposed the use of truth.
Yet, even if this guess explains something, is it really possible to reduce everything
50 Feferman [5]; see Shanker [31, p. 111].
51 Cf. Wang [41], especially chapter 9.
52 [14, p. 150].
53 Hintikka [22, p. 8].
54 Feferman [5] (Shanker [31, p. 109]).
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to extreme caution? Feferman later adds: “One can’t help but wonder whether the
omission of Tarski’s name here was not deliberate”. 55
Another example is supplied by remarks in [12]. Giving a sketch of the de0nition of
ordinal de0nable sets, G"odel does not mention the de0nition of satisfaction, although
it is essential for a precise de0nition. One can say that G"odel presented just the idea
of the construction but, Feferman remarks, “if it had been anyone else, Tarski surely
would have complained about the omission”. 56
A third example is indicated in Parsons’ comment on G"odel’s Russell paper. 57 Par-
son says that there is a puzzling diWculty in the interpretation of the rami0ed type
theory, in which higher-order variables range over predicates, or linguistic objects “ex-
pressing” propositional functions. Namely, “translating a statement about propositional
functions of order n as about one predicates, namely predicates containing quanti0ers
only for propositional functions of order ¡n, requires the notion of satisfaction, or
at least truth, for the language with quanti0ers of order ¡ n”. G"odel made no men-
tion of this fact. Parsons continues: “It is surprising that G"odel nowhere remarks on
this fact, particularly since in this context we would have to suppose satisfaction or
truth introduced by an inductive de0nition, another obstacle to applying the idea in
reducing arithmetic to logic”. 58 This would have helped G"odel, as his point was that
mathematics could not be reduced to logic, because some mathematical means must
have had to be assumed in advance. Therefore, a mention of the inductive de0nition
of satisfaction would strengthen his argument against logicism. Thus we witness again
G"odel’s unwillingness to de0ne truth.
To explain G"odel’s silence Parsons suggests that G"odel did not distinguish clearly
between a nominalist theory that eliminates objectively existing concepts and, on the
other hand, the theory in which “every concept in the range of a quanti0er” is “signi-
0ed” by an expression, but “reference to concepts is not actually eliminated”. 59
Banning the possibility of G"odel’s confusion (while always possible, his lack of
understanding should not be considered seriously as the 0rst attempt towards our un-
derstanding of the situation), we have to accept the fact that even when G"odel proposes
a constructivistic theory, in which every object is named, he still maintains a Platonist
vision, according to which the objects exist objectively. This suggests that G"odel’s
philosophical views are the key to his approach.
5. Why the silence?
Let us ask the fundamental question again. Why, except for some footnotes, did
G"odel never mention a Tarski-style theory of truth?
55 Feferman [6, p. 57].
56 Feferman [6, p. 59].
57 That is, G"odel [11]; see [14, pp. 111, 112].
58 [14, p. 112].
59 Ibidem.
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WolePnski remarked in his article on the “semantic revolution” that G"odel never
used Tarski’s key term “semantics”. 60 Georg Kreisel, who knew G"odel rather well,
stated directly that G"odel “simply had no feeling for the subject”. 61 Knowing G"odel’s
penetrating approach we should try to 0nd reasons for this lack of feeling.
G"odel ignored Tarski’s research program so persistently that no “standard” expla-
nation can elucidate that. The three explanations mentioned above are: (i) there was
no need to repeat the work already done, (ii) Tarski’s achievement was obvious to
G"odel, (iii) G"odel’s exceptional caution. Let us summarize the arguments given above
against the three proposals. First, as to (i), it was not simply the case that Tarski had
done the work, so there was no need to repeat it. G"odel almost never mentioned the
achievement, except for one remark in a lecture of 1940, published posthumously (see
Section 2). In connection to (ii): the obviousness is no explanation for the omitting of
the name of Tarski in contexts in which an application of the de0nition of satisfaction
was useful, and even necessary (see Section 4). Finally, as to (iii), the point was not
just the caution, revealed so convincingly by Feferman, and also by Wang (see Sec-
tion 3). Even if Hilbert and the logical positivists did not want to consider the concept
of truth as diQerent from provability, others—Tarski in particular—did. Carnap was
inHuenced by Tarski, and remained an authority in Austria and in Germany, and later
in USA. When G"odel was in America he was in no way dependent on the German
academic establishment. And in the US an important role in the determination of re-
search 0elds was played by Tarski. Perhaps, as was suggested by Kreisel, 62 G"odel all
his life fought against the views of his colleagues from Vienna. Yet if he had felt the
need to mention Tarski and his program of scienti0c semantics, he could have done
that in his lecture of 1950s, in his manuscripts, or in his conversations with Wang in
1960s and 1970s. He did not. This means he did not want to.
Tarski wanted to give an adequate de0nition of truth, at least for the language of
mathematics, using the means of formal logic. The fact that G"odel did not acknowledge
the importance of the problem posed by Tarski must be treated seriously. The only way
to understand this is to refer to G"odel’s philosophical views. His personality could play
a role but this may be considered only as a background to his sincerely held views.
Otherwise we would engage in a cheap psychoanalysis, and who among us would like
to have others analyze him or her that way instead of considering our views? G"odel’s
views are important not only for an analysis of his life, but also for all of us, because
his role and authority in the 0eld of logic has been rightly compared to that of Aristotle.
It seems to be beyond doubt that G"odel is among the most determined and persistent
believers in the power of logic and pure reason. The options he preferred can reveal
something important.
Let us consider three ideas that can help understand G"odel’s reserve vis-a-vis Tarski’s
program. They are: (A) the idea of truth as the intuitive provability “in general”
60 WolePnski [45, p. 5]. At the same time WolePnski stresses the importance of G"odel’s achievements for
the “semantic revolution”.
61 Kreisel [24, p. 122].
62 Kreisel [23].
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(B) the idea of truth as an inexhaustible idea in the sense of Kant (C) the idea of
logic as the universal language (in the sense of Hintikka).
A. Truth is intuitive: Looking for hints, let us consider G"odel’s correspondence with
Zermelo. 63 In his 1931 lecture Zermelo criticized “Skolemism”, or a view that admits
countable models of set theory. He did not understand G"odel’s paper and clearly was
angry (as was also Hilbert). He was looking for a mistake in the paper, mostly on the
basis of the idea of the proof given in the introductory part. G"odel wrote to him that
the assumption that truth can be de0ned inside the formal theory itself was made by
him: was “yours, not mine”. It is, by the way, the 0rst known written statement of
the thesis on the unde0nability of truth. Zermelo’s opinion was that if no limitation is
imposed on the concept of proof, in particular proofs are not required to be 0nitistic,
then truth is the same as provability in the general sense. No sentence is absolutely
undecidable, said Zermelo. 64
It is most interesting and signi0cant that G"odel, despite his polemic with Zermelo,
shared that opinion. This may seem surprising as it was G"odel who discovered in-
completeness. Also, as we have seen (cf. Section 2) he stressed that due to himself
(and Tarski) everyone could realize that “objective mathematical truth” is diQerent
from provability. However, in the Gibbs lecture of 1951 G"odel presented the fa-
mous “G"odel’s alternative” and suggested that there are no fundamentally undecidable
problems—at least in mathematics. G"odel’s opinion was that on the basis of his theo-
rems it can be proved that either human mind is not mechanical or in number theory
there exist problems unsolvable by the mind. Thus, alternative is weaker than the plain
thesis on the non-mechanical nature of the mind, which according to some authors
follows from incompleteness theorems. Yet G"odel also believed in the non-mechanical
nature of our minds: in 1972 he wrote to Wang that we can reject the second part
of the alternative. 65 His opinion is then similar to that of Hilbert and Zermelo: there
are no absolutely undecidable mathematical problems. “Absolutely” means “by any
mathematical proof the human mind can conceive”. 66 At the same time G"odel very
carefully distinguished between provability “in general” and provability in a given for-
mal system (and also between a formal system and a formal system given to us). The
restricted provability was of no importance for Zermelo so he did not grasp G"odel’s
results. However, because G"odel believed that each problem can be decided, or that
each statement will be proved or disproved, it seems that, according to him, mathe-
matical truth is provability in the most general sense. If so, de0ning it set-theoretically
contributes nothing. It would help us neither in proving nor in perceiving the truth of
a statement. To 0nd mathematical truth, intuition is needed as much as before.
Another con0rmation of the view that the semantic conception of truth brings no
progress is seen in the fact that G"odel emphasized the epistemological importance of
investigations of the foundations of mathematics. The aim of the research would be the
63 See Dawson [4, pp. 75–77]. The correspondence between G"odel and Zermelo has been published by
Grattan-Guiness [16] and by Dawson [3].
64 His 1931 lecture in Bad Elster was published in 1932 under the title: “ "Uber Stufen der Quanti0kation
und die Logik des Unendlichen”. For Zermelo quanti0ers are in0nite conjunctions and disjunctions.
65 Wang [38, p. 324].
66 “Gibbs lecture”, [15, p. 310].
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establishing of more secure foundations. As has been mentioned above (in Section 2)
G"odel in his 1938 lecture at Zilsel’s said that Tarski’s mathematical argument gave
no epistemological advantage. And, said G"odel in that lecture, to make a consistency
proof satisfactory we have to reduce the consistency of a theory to its part or to another
theory, one that is “more evident, reliable”. 67 Then the foundations of the initial theory
would be made stronger.
The epistemological aspect is also treated by Goldfarb in his introduction to the
(never completed) G"odel’s paper on Carnap. 68 When Carnap presented the concept
of mathematics as the linguistic framework truths, he did not care about the proofs of
consistency or about minimizing the metatheoretical assumptions. He admitted in0nitary
methods (for example, in order to de0ne truth). For G"odel who accepted the Hilbertian
goal of establishing some legitimization of mathematics, Carnap’s approach is circular,
or “at best philosophically and mathematically empty”. 69 Mathematical intuition cannot
be replaced by conventions about the use of symbols. Seen in this light, Tarski’s
semantic conception provides no stronger foundations to mathematics. Therefore, for
G"odel it has no philosophical value. Intuition remains the foundation of mathematics,
and it includes an intuitive grasp of truth.
B. Truth as an inexhaustible idea, not a concept: Truth is an everyday concept
as well as a classical philosophical notion. Satisfaction, similarly to G9ultigkeit or
Richtigkeit, is a technical concept. When applied to formulas of formalized languages,
for example the language of arithmetic, truth and satisfaction (by arbitrary valuations)
are usually identi0ed. WolePnski [42] suggests that we must not identify the two terms.
His objective was to question the thesis that G"odel had proved the theorem on the un-
de0nability of truth before Tarski. Perhaps G"odel meant only the unde0nability of the
set of contentually correct arithmetical formulas. WolePnski observes that in Hilbert’s
school the concept of validity (or Algemeineg9ultigkeit) was accepted, but “the fate of
the concept of truth was completely diQerent”. 70 One way to understand this is to
note that truth of arithmetical formulas can be reduced to the simplest equalities and
inequalities, like ‘1 + 0 = 1’, ‘0 = 1’, and “truth in general” is a category that must be
applicable to all kinds of sentential expressions.
Another version of the above argument can be derived from G"odel’s negative at-
titude to any emphasis on the role of language. For example, he said that “language
is useful : : : but this is a purely practical aQair”. It helps “to 0x our attention on
abstract objects, this is the only importance of language”. 71 In contrast, Tarski’s def-
inition is centered on language. Recursive conditions reduce the truth, or, rather, sat-
isfaction, of complex sentences to the truth or satisfaction of their components. The
procedure reHects the syntactic structure of sentences, and ultimately leads to the sim-
plest sentential fragments, or atomic sentences. For them everything is to be obvious.
67 [15, p. 89]
68 [15, pp. 329–330].
69 Goldfarb [15, p. 330].
70 WolePnski [42]; see [44, p. 137].
71 Stated in 1971, see Wang [41, p. 180].
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The de0nition is close to an identity: P(x) is satis0ed if and only if the property
denoted, in a realization, by P applies to the value of the variable x.
This procedure may be enough for arithmetic, as in this case the atomic sentences
are about identity, addition, multiplication. One can say that here, indeed, we talk about
satisfaction in a model, or validity or G"ultigkeit. In other cases, however, when we talk
about more mundane or less concrete objects, the truth of atomic sentences remains
problematic and needs explanation. G"odel said explicitly that “the full concept of class
(truth, concept, being, etc.) is not used in mathematics”. 72
Truth is too grand to be described fully. We know what it is, but how can we give a
precise de0nition? Tarski’s de0nition, or rather construction, grasps at most one aspect
of ‘true’. His de0nition can be defended by remarking that it is to be applied to a
special category of sentences: we are not talking about sentences describing weather,
but about mathematical sentences. Yet even in the restricted case G"odel seems to think
that truth is like an idea in the sense of Kant. 73 This suggestion is con0rmed by a
remark in Kantian spirit, made by G"odel to Wang: “We can never describe an Idea in
words exhaustively or completely clearly”. 74 This remark was made about “absolute
demonstrability and de0nability” but it seems that it can be applied to truth, or perhaps,
rather, “absolute truth”.
To understand G"odel’s position let us notice that provability and de0nability in
a 0xed formalized system can be mathematically described; the absolute provability
or de0nability cannot. They cannot be perceived in reference to any one system but
they must be related to a non-eQectively developing hierarchy of systems. In G"odel’s
wording, the former are concepts and the latter ideas, or something more general.
This explanation fails, however, to clarify G"odel’s approach suWciently. If we think
about truth “in general” as something going beyond the concept of truth related to any
given system, then the latter should be seen as good, as something fragmentary but
valuable. If so, then for G"odel, Tarski’s de0nition would have been useful as was the
de0nition of provability in a system. This interpretation would be probably approved
not only by G"odel but also by Tarski. Where is then the diQerence, the root of G"odel’s
rejection of Tarski’s approach?
According to G"odel, in order to have concepts we 0rst have to perceive the general
idea behind them. “Ideas are more fundamental than concepts”. 75 Truth “in general”
referring to mathematical sentences would be something common to all Tarski style
de0nitions, or rather would be the source of all those de0nitions. Ideas are fundamental
but are not fully expressible and therefore the program of semantics can have only
limited value. In particular it will never reveal the essence of truth.
C. Logic as the universal language: It is striking that G"odel seems to deny the im-
portance of the distinction between theory and metatheory. He certainly understands the
diQerence—his famous 1931 paper assumes a careful distinction between the language
and speaking about the language—but he does not want to treat the distinguishing
72 Wang [38, p. 188].
73 This view was suggested (orally) by Jan WolePnski.
74 Wang [41, p. 268], quotation No. 8.4.21. Cf. also Wang [41, p. 188].
75 Wang [41, p. 268], quotation No. 8.4.20.
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of the levels of language as the method of solving problems. And Tarski proposed
precisely this as the method of overcoming the antinomies.
G"odel’s attitude is seen in the 1944 article on Russell’s logic. He wrote that in
the theory of types the following condition of the meaningfulness of expressions is
accepted: “Whenever an object x can replace another object y in one meaningful
proposition, it can do so in every meaningful proposition”. 76 Then all objects are
divided into equivalence classes determined by this relation of substitution. However,
to express the condition we must violate it, because we have to talk about x, y ranging
over arbitrary objects. To G"odel this is suspect, even though in a footnote he adds
that the objection does not apply to “the symbolic”, or nominalistic, interpretation of
the theory of types, when one speaks only about symbols, not about objects. It is
well known that he rejected nominalism. 77 In the case when the theory of types is
about objects (concepts, classes), and the transgression of the condition is made by
its very statement, G"odel makes no attempt to solve the problem by distinguishing the
metatheory from the theory itself. He assumes that the same logic must be used at
each level. There is one logic, it applies to every discourse. G"odel follows Russell,
and also Zermelo.
G"odel made an interesting commentary about a remark made by Russell in a letter
of 1963. Russell admitted that he had been perplexed by G"odel’s results. 78 Working
on the system of logic, he did not think it is possible to demonstrate that a collection
of axioms does not lead to contradiction, and at the same time his axioms (with the
exception of the axiom of reducibility) seemed to him to be “luminously self-evident”.
And “if a given set of axioms leads to a contradiction, it is clear that at least one of the
axioms must be false”. Now, when G"odel learned about Russell’s letter he wrote that
Russell misinterprets his result “in a very interesting manner”. 79 It seems that G"odel
could refer only to the sentences just quoted. What did he mean? What was Russell’s
error? Perhaps Russell thought that G"odel showed the possibility of a contradiction
in Principia Mathematica. In reality G"odel only proved that its consistency cannot
be proved by means expressible in the system. What seemed to be so interesting to
G"odel? We do not know, so we must guess.
Perhaps the point is that Russell expressed the traditional view: the axioms of logic
are true, indubitably true. If they cannot be doubted their truth cannot follow from
empirical data referring to the physical world. Probably, G"odel liked Russell’s position.
And this can be compared to a statement made by Tarski in a letter of 1944. 80 Tarski
stated that mathematical and logical truths do not diQer in origin from empirical truths.
That is why empirical changes can provoke changes in the underlying logic. G"odel
was of the opposite opinion: logic is about an ideal realm, containing concepts, sets,
numbers. It “deals with formal—in the sense of universally applicable—concepts”. 81
76 G"odel [11]; [14, p. 138].
77 In particular, the text on Carnap’s philosophy is devoted to showing that; see [15, pp. 334–363].
78 Letter to L. Henkin of April 1, 1963, is quoted by Dawson [2] (see Shanker [31, p. 90]).
79 Letter to A. Robinson of July 2, 1973; see Dawson [2], (Shanker [31, p. 91]).
80 In White [47], 31; quoted after Rodriguez-Consuegra, in Wolkowski [93], 190.
81 Wang [41, p. 267].
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We learn about them due to a special intuition. Therefore true logic exists. There is
no space for changes in logic, let alone a multiplicity of logics.
In the letter mentioned above, Russell seems to treat logical truth similarly to the
usual truth. This also could appeal to G"odel. Earlier, he approvingly quoted Russell,
who had said that “logic is concerned with the real world as truly as zoology, though
with its more abstract and general features”. 82 For G"odel, truth is a primitive concept;
he said that the original concept of language comprises “truth, falsity, inference”. 83
What he means is a language with a natural (intended) interpretation, and not a product
that can be interpreted in various ways.
In general, to use Hintikka’s terms, in his approach to semantics G"odel seems to
have been very serious about the tradition of the understanding of logic as the uni-
versal language, which is opposed to the perception of logic as a calculus that can
be reinterpreted. For him the rules of inference constitute the heart of logic, and it is
hard to apply to them the methods of model theory. This “universalism” agrees with
Frege’s approach, and that of Russell, too. Language is an environment, within which
we remain, and its semantics cannot be described (linguistically) from outside, because
when we speak it we have to understand it, so we remain inside. This was argued by
Wittgenstein: we can’t leave the language in the same sense as we can’t leave the
world. On the other hand, Hilbert developed the axiomatic method so that it can be
applied to logic. An axiomatic system could be seen as a formal creation, and investi-
gated from outside. This gave rise to metalogic, and the investigation of various logical
calculi. The approach was used by L"owenheim, and among its forerunners were Boole,
Peirce, and Schr"oder. Later Tarski developed the theory of models. The existence of
the two approaches opposing each other was 0rst described by J. van Heijenoort, who
wrote about logic “as calculus”, or calculus ratiocinator, and on logic “as a language”,
that is also lingua characteristica. 84
Hintikka generalized that observation and has been writing about two approaches:
one sees the language as a universal medium, the other as a calculus that can be inter-
preted in various worlds. According to him, the distinguishing of the two approaches
gives rise to a major division of modern philosophers (not only Russell and Wittgen-
stein but also Heidegger thought that one cannot step outside language). 85 The model
theoretic approach is becoming more and more popular, but some philosophers deny
its philosophical importance. Hintikka links the diQerentiation between the attitudes
to language to another diQerence, that between the thinking about one world and the
“many-world assumption”. When re-interpretation of a language is rejected, the lan-
guage can be used only for talking about the world, or the only true world. “Hence
a kind of one-world assumption is implicit in the idea of language as the universal
medium”. 86 This kind of analysis is useful in describing G"odel’s views. In particular
82 G"odel [11,14, p. 120].
83 Wang [41, p. 266], quote 8.4.11.
84 Heijenoort [17].
85 Hintikka’s articles on the topic are gathered in the volume [21]. The author argues for the superiority
of the model theoretic approach. He also shows that for a natural extension of elementary logic truth can
be de0ned within the system.
86 Hintikka [21, p. xi].
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it shows a diQerence between G"odel and Tarski. They both considered interpreted lan-
guages, not purely formal ones. For Tarski it could be interpreted in various domains,
and for G"odel the only essential domain was the whole world, or its appropriate as-
pect. Thus in [32] Tarski considers various algebras of sets. For G"odel the language
of the calculus of sets would refer to the realm of all sets. Restrictions, even when
mathematically fruitful, would have no fundamental, philosophical importance.
Clearly, G"odel understood the two approaches to logic. His contribution to the model-
theoretic approach was fundamental; his completeness proof gives an obvious example.
Initially, Hintikka listed him as one of those who accepted the model-theoretic approach
to logic; he even said that “the breakthrough of the entire model-theoretic Denkweise
was to a considerable extent due to G"odel himself”. 87 Later, 88 Hintikka has been
stressing (with regret) that G"odel remained faithful to the vision of language being
universal, and also to the “one-world assumption”. He was not attracted by the logi-
cal model theory; he seemed to be hostile. Why? It seems that G"odel was interested
primarily in the intended, true model, that is in the reality, though not necessarily the
physical one. The theories of numbers and sets have the intended, true interpretations.
Of course, G"odel understands (and, in fact, made all of us understand) that his con-
structible sets constitute a model, or a submodel of a given model, in which all sets are
constructible. However, for him the main question is: is the axiom of constructibility,
V =L, true? His answer is negative, but to argue for it we must use our basic, intuitive
concept of truth. No help will be provided by a Tarski-style de0nition of truth in a
model, be it V or L.
Introducing the distinction between the two visions of logic, Hintikka stressed that
when we see the language as a universal medium, then “the most important casualty
of the prohibition against metalogic is the concept of truth”. 89 In fact, Frege—as Kant
before him—wrote that according to him “truth is unde0nable”. 90 From the present
perspective this statement is about the concept of satisfaction as a relation between
linguistic expressions, which can be interpreted in various ways, and the reality (model),
to which the interpreted expressions are relating. We may use the concept but we cannot
describe it fully, because we can’t describe the language from outside.
Hintikka seems to have pointed at an extremely important source of the conviction
that semantics is inexpressible. One can be glad that model theory is promoted by him.
I do not feel, however, that he is right when he states that G"odel’s rejection of this
approach was anachronistic, and resulted from a feeling of insecurity because he did not
dare “to leave the familiar ground of the actual world and venture to speculate about
unrealized possibilities”. 91 To see a fundamental border between the actual world and
possible worlds is by no means bizarre. G"odel asks the question that does interest all
of us: what does really happen in the realm of abstract objects?
87 Hintikka [19], see [21, p. 32].
88 In particular in [22].
89 Hintikka [18, p. 2].
90 Frege [7, p. 189]; quoted after [8, p. 132].
91 Hintikka [22, p. 50]. I think such an explanation is not fair. G"odel had mental problems but this does
not diminish the importance of his views.
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G"odel remains a consistent and persistent believer in mathematical and logical Pla-
tonism. Rather than asking “what could take place?” he asks “what is really taking
place?” In the previously mentioned 1944 article on Russell’s logic he expressed the
hope that one could apply the idea that gave rise to the theory of types, without that
dubious condition of the meaningfulness of expressions, so that we could get “the
picture of the real state of aQairs”, only in some “limiting points” they would lose
sense; semantical paradoxes would appear then—says the famous G"odel’s metaphor—
as “something analogous to dividing by zero”. 92 This is a proposal to look for truth
in an entirely diQerent direction than that proposed by Tarski. 93
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